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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3414 
 ___________ 
 
 DANIEL HEATH, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
SUPT. ROBERT SHANNON; JOHN KERESTES, Dept. Supt. For Facilities 
Management of SCI Frackville Prison; BARBARA G. MALEWSKI, Chief Healthcare 
Administrator of FCI Frackville Prison; DAVID MARTIN, P.A.; R.N. PAM 
WOLFGANG; P.A. JESSICA HOCK; P.A. WYCHOCK; R.N. SANDY DAVIS; DR. 
O’CONNER; P.A. SLIVKA; P.A. SINGH; P.A. MICHAEL SIMS; R.N. PATTY 
WOLFE; R.N. BARBARA BRIGHT 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 4-04-cv-02275) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 17, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
  
(Opinion filed: August 25, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Daniel Heath appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders granting the 
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defendants’ motions to dismiss, their motion for judgment on the pleadings, and their 
motions for summary judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in part,  
vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for further proceedings.  
  In October 2004, Heath, a state prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that he 
had been denied adequate medical care for “mysterious abdominal pains and other related 
abdominal problems.”  Ultimately, Heath was diagnosed with a perforated stomach ulcer 
and underwent emergency surgery on December 1, 2003, during which 70 percent of his 
stomach was removed.  As a result, Heath asserts that he will be on medication and will 
require special dietary care for the rest of his life.  He named as defendants prison 
officials and medical staff at the State Correctional Institution in Frackville, Pennsylvania 
(“SCI-Frackville”).1
  The District Court issued a series of decisions granting the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss, their motion for judgment on the pleadings, and their motions for 
summary judgment.  In particular, the District Court dismissed claims against a doctor 
who had died, held that claims which allegedly accrued before October 2002 were barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations, and found that Heath had failed to demonstrate 
that certain defendants had any personal involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional 
   
                                                 
1  Specifically, Heath sued the following individuals:  Superintendent Robert Shannon; 
Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management John Kerestes; Health Care 
Administrator Barbara Malewski; Physician Assistants (“P.A.”) David Martin, Jessica 
Hock, Michael Sims, and Don Silva; Registered Nurses (“R.N.”) Pam Wolfgang, Barbara 
Bright, Sandy Davis, and Patty Wolfe; and Doctors Wychock, Robert O’Connor, and 
Singh.  
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conduct.  To the extent that the defendants were sued in their official capacities, the 
District Court held that they were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.  
With respect to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the District 
Court found that none of Heath’s allegations suggested that the defendants were 
motivated by racial or class-based discriminatory animus, or that there was an agreement 
by the defendants to violate his civil rights.  With respect to those claims which were 
sufficient to proceed to the summary judgment stage, the District Court held that the facts 
failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference and that Heath failed to demonstrate through 
expert testimony that the defendants’ actions caused him harm.  Heath appealed. 
   We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
Court exercises plenary review over the District Court’s grant of the Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint and 
draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-
94 (2007) (per curiam).  To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)).  Plenary review also applies to the order granting summary judgment.  
DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is proper where, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all 
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inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. 
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). 
  Although the District Court properly disposed of the majority of Heath’s 
claims, it erred in granting summary judgment in favor of P.A. Martin.   
P.A. Martin 
  Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, prison officials are required to provide basic medical treatment to inmates. 
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  In order to show a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must show that 
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  The alleged violation must be beyond mere 
negligence.  Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993). 
  On November 10, 2003, Heath sought treatment at the SCI-Frackville 
infirmary, and was seen by P.A. Martin.  In his declaration, Heath alleged that he 
complained that his kidneys felt like they were on fire, that he had stomach cramps, and 
that he was vomiting a substance that resembled black coffee grounds.  Later in his 
declaration, Heath claimed that there was black fluid coming out of his nose at the time 
of the examination.  Despite these complaints, Heath asserted that P.A. Martin told him 
that “there is nothing wrong with you,” suggested he apply a “hot compress,” and advised 
him to purchase over-the-counter medications from the prison commissary.  Heath claims 
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that he returned to his housing unit in severe pain.  The Progress Notes for November 10, 
2003, entered by P.A. Martin indicate that Heath complained of “kidneys on fire,” vague 
symptoms, and “numerous disconnected complaints.”  The Notes also reflect that Heath 
had no “flank discomfort to palpation or percussion” and that a “GI evaluation” was 
“normal.”  In line with Heath’s allegations, the Notes state that he was told to use “moist 
heat” and “OTC analgesics.”  Heath did not return to the infirmary with stomach related 
problems until December 1, 2003, the day he underwent surgery. 
  The District Court initially denied the motion for summary judgment filed 
by P.A. Martin, noting that the “parties’ versions of [the November 10, 2003,] 
examination differ markedly.”  In particular, the District Court held that “[b]ecause there 
is no mention of the black fluid in the progress notes from Martin’s examination of Heath 
on November 10, 2003, a credibility dispute exists as to whether Heath told and/or 
showed Martin that he had black fluid coming out of his nose.”  P.A. Martin moved for 
leave to file a second motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.  In 
support of the renewed motion for summary judgment, P.A. Martin claimed that “Heath 
did not complain of abdominal pain or that he had vomited a substance which looked like 
black coffee beans or that this black substance was coming from his nose.”  Even if 
Heath had made those symptoms known, P.A. Martin suggested that “[t]o a reasonable 
medical certainty I do not believe that [Heath] would have had a different outcome if he 
had surgery on November 10, 2003.”  Ultimately, P.A. Martin “base[d] his motion for 
summary judgment on the complete failure of Heath to have any evidence that Martin’s 
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failure to diagnose his condition on November 10, 2003 caused him any injury.”  This 
“causal relationship” theory was based on two not precedential district court cases:  
Walthour v. Tennis, No. 06-0086, 2009 WL 2957742 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2009), and 
Miszler v. Shoemaker, No. 04-1756, 2009 WL 790139 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009). 
  The District Court directed Heath to file “his opposition, including 
opposing briefs and statements of material facts, as required by M.D. Pa. LR 56.1.”  
Heath submitted an opposition brief, supporting exhibits, and a declaration.  In the 
declaration, Heath again stated that he informed P.A. Martin of “a black fluid that kept 
coming up out of my mouth and/or nose that resembled black coffee grounds, even 
showed him some from my nose.”  Heath asserted that P.A. Martin’s failure to properly 
treat him “caused Heath inordinate delay in obtaining diagnoses and treatment, thus 
prolonging his substantial pain and suffering.”   
  The District Court granted P.A. Martin’s motion for summary judgment.  
First, the District Court held that Heath did not comply with the local rule (LR 56.1) 
governing motions for summary judgment.  Specifically, Heath failed to “respond 
directly to the numbered paragraphs” in P.A. Martin’s statement of material facts and 
failed to “cite to the parts of the record that support his statements.”  Thus, the District 
Court “deemed admitted” all material facts set forth in P.A. Martin’s statement of 
material facts, including his claim that Heath did not complain of abdominal pain or 
vomiting.  In this regard, the District Court essentially dismissed the claims against P.A. 
Martin as a sanction for failing to comply with LR 56.1.  Of course, when using dismissal 
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as a sanction, a District Court is ordinarily required to consider and balance six factors 
enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 
1984).  The District Court did not do so here. 
  In any event, however, Heath’s complaints (or lack thereof) of specific 
symptoms did not figure prominently in the District Court’s conclusion that P.A. Martin 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The District Court stated:   
 . . . Heath has failed to submit any expert medical evidence to 
contradict Martin’s professional medical opinion that the medical 
treatment he provided was reasonable and appropriate and that he 
did not believe that the medical treatment that was provided to 
Heath presented a substantial risk of serious harm to him.  
Moreover, because a perforated ulcer is a “sophisticated” medical 
condition, and thus a causal relationship between Martin’s 
alleged deliberate indifference and Heath’s damages is not 
“obvious,” medical expert testimony would be required to 
educate the jury as to whether an alternative to surgery would 
have existed if Heath had been diagnosed with a perforated ulcer 
on November 10, 2003, or if he would have had a different 
outcome if he had surgery on November 10 rather than 
December 1.  Because Heath has failed to present this expert 
evidence to counter Martin’s verification, and in fact testified at 
his deposition that no medical expert has indicated an interest in 
testifying for him in this case, Martin’s medical opinion on the 
aforementioned issues must be deemed unopposed . . . .  
 
  We have held that a prisoner’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need requires expert testimony when the seriousness of the injury or illness 
would not be apparent to a lay person.  Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473-74 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that jury would not be in a position to decide whether ulnar nerve 
injury, scalp condition, knee disorder, and migraine headaches could be classified as 
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“serious”).  Here, however, the District Court repeatedly stated that Heath’s perforated 
stomach ulcer constituted a serious medical need as required under Estelle.  (Dist. Ct. 
Doc. Nos. 46, p. 10-11; 87, p. 10; 116, p. 7; 134, p. 16).  Even without hindsight into 
Heath’s underlying condition, there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether Heath 
informed P.A. Martin about the black fluid coming from his nose and, if so, whether P.A. 
Martin’s lack of treatment caused an injury to Heath.  In this connection, the District 
Court erred by effectively crediting the “professional medical opinion” of P.A. Martin, a 
Physician Assistant who has a stake in the outcome of the case.  Notably, P.A. Martin’s 
declaration provides no basis for his conclusion that Heath “would [not] have had a 
different outcome if he had surgery on November 10, 2003.”  Furthermore, the District 
Court relied on Heath’s statement -- made at a deposition taken in August 2007 -- that he 
was unable to locate an expert to testify at trial, without providing Heath with a further 
opportunity to designate an expert to support his claim.  Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2009) 
(concerning availability of affidavits in summary judgment proceedings); 26(a)(2) 
(regarding disclosure of expert testimony).  Accordingly, we will vacate that portion of 
the District Court’s order, entered on July 30, 2010, which granted summary judgment in 
favor of P.A. Martin.  
P.A. Hock and R.N. Wolfgang 
  We conclude, however, that the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of P.A. Hock and R.N. Wolfgang.  P.A. Hock treated Heath on January 
8, 2003, when he visited the SCI-Frackville infirmary complaining of an upset stomach 
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and noting that he had not had a bowel movement in three to four days.  P.A. Hock wrote 
in the Progress Notes that Heath’s abdomen was “soft” and “nontender,” but not 
distended, and that there were no masses.  Concluding that Heath was constipated, Heath 
was given 30 cubic centimeters of milk of magnesia and was prescribed Colace.  Heath 
stated in his declaration that he did not actually receive the Colace.  
  R.N. Wolfgang treated Heath on December 1, 2003.  On that date, Heath 
began experiencing severe stomach pains and started vomiting around 2:45 a.m.  He 
requested medical care, and R.N. Wolfgang arrived at Heath’s cell.  According to Heath, 
R.N. Wolfgang and the guards “just stood around [him] talking amongst themselves” for 
10 to 15 minutes.  Heath was then handcuffed and “made to walk, practically crawl, 
along the tier and down a flight of stairs to an awaiting wheelchair.”  Once he arrived in 
the prison emergency room, Heath “was made to lie on a hard examination table, still 
hand-cuffed, for nearly five (5) hours, until arrangements were made to have him 
transported out of the prison.”  According to a security logbook, Heath notified guards 
that he “needed to be seen by medical for stomach pains” at 4:20 a.m., and was 
transported to the prison ER approximately 20 minutes later.  The Housing Unit A Log 
indicates that a nurse arrived to see Heath at 4:15 a.m.  In her declaration, R.N. Wolfgang 
stated that she took Heath’s vital signs and felt his abdomen.  R.N. Wolfgang was ordered 
by a doctor to keep Heath in the infirmary until another doctor arrived later in the 
morning and to administer a pain medication, which she did at 5:00 a.m.  Before her shift 
ended at 6:00 a.m., R.N. Wolfgang took Heath’s vital signs again, performed an 
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Electrocardiogram, and submitted a report on Heath’s status.  Later that morning, Heath 
was transported to SCI-Mahoney, where a member of the prison medical staff ordered 
that he be taken to the hospital. 
  These facts fail to indicate that P.A. Hock and R.N. Wolfgang acted with 
deliberate indifference.2
Remaining Defendants and Claims 
  Both defendants examined Heath upon his request and 
responded promptly to his complaints.  Although Heath would have preferred a different 
course of treatment, his dissatisfaction does not establish a cause of action.  Inmates of 
Allegheny Jail v. Pierce, 612 F. 2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (courts will “disavow any 
attempt to second- guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . 
(which) remains a question of sound professional judgment.” (citations omitted)).    
  Heath first reported gastrointestinal problems to the staff at the infirmary at 
SCI-Frackville in April 1995.  He raised similar complaints three additional times in 
1995, and once in 1996.  According to Heath, he was “simply given Maalox, Milk of 
Magnesia, or no treatment at all . . . .”   Heath did not return to the infirmary for treatment 
of stomach pains until January 8, 2003.  Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are 
subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  See Wilson v. 
                                                 
2  The District Court initially denied R.N. Wolfgang’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Heath “has adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that 
Wolfgang was aware of the need to provide medical attention and intentionally failed to 
do so . . . .”  As with P.A. Martin, R.N. Wolfgang was permitted to submit another 
motion for summary judgment.  In her renewed motion, R.N. Wolfgang again relied on 
her declaration and Heath’s medical chart, but she also provided log books confirming 
the timing of events. 
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Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).  The statute of limitations for personal injury 
actions in Pennsylvania is two years.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.  Heath filed his 
complaint in October 2004.  Accordingly, the District Court properly held that the claims 
arising out Heath’s efforts to obtain treatment in the 1990s are time-barred.  Heath has 
not established a basis for equitably tolling the limitations period, Santos ex rel. Beato v. 
United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009), and his “continuing violation” theory 
fails because the alleged incidents of improper medical care in 1995 and 1996 are 
individually actionable and bear no connection to the treatment he received starting in 
2003.  O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006).   
  In addition, the District Court properly dismissed those defendants who had 
no personal involvement in the alleged denial of Heath’s constitutional rights.  We have 
consistently held that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal 
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation 
of respondeat superior.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Heath has not claimed that Doctors Wychock and O’Connor, and Physician Assistants 
Silva and Sims, were personally involved in the medical treatment which forms the basis 
of his complaint.  Likewise, Superintendent Shannon, Deputy Superintendent Kerestes, 
and Health Care Administrator Malewski appear to have been named solely on the basis 
of their supervisory positions.  Indeed, Heath claimed only that these defendants “failed 
to train, supervise and/or control” their subordinates.  Thus, the claims brought against 
these defendants also fail.  Durmer, 991 F. 2d at 69 n. 14 (holding that liability under 
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§ 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior). 
  The District Court also properly dismissed the claims brought against the 
prison officials, to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities.  Will v. 
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  Furthermore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Heath’s conspiracy claims.  Although Heath sought to raise 
a claim under § 1985 in his complaint, he failed to allege any fact from which one could 
infer an agreement or understanding among the defendants to violate his constitutional 
rights, or to discriminate against him on account of his race.  Because Heath failed to 
state a conspiracy claim under § 1985, the District Court properly ruled that his related § 
1986 claims also failed.  Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980).  We 
also reject Heath’s arguments that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his 
requests for appointment of counsel, Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993), 
and by granting certain defendants leave to file a second motion for summary judgment 
out of time, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  Finally, 
contrary to Heath’s assertion, we conclude that the District Court was not obligated to 
afford Heath an opportunity to file an amended complaint.  Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that district courts need not extend 
plaintiffs an opportunity to amend before dismissing a complaint, where amendment 
would be inequitable or futile). 
  For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 
the matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In 
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particular, we will vacate that portion of the District Court’s July 30, 2010, which granted 
summary judgment in favor of P.A. Martin. 
 
 
